"The Earth and everything that's in it"

Saturday, April 3, 2004

Missouri Attorney General April 3, 2004 Report of CRIME

Missouri Attorney General's Office

Saturday, April 03, 2004

Missouri Attorney General's Office
Supreme Court Building
207 W. High St.
P.O. Box 899
Jefferson City, MO 65102

Phone: 573-751-3321
Fax: 573-751-0774

Re: Perjury and Prosecutorial Suborning of Perjury
Case # CR203-1336M, Camden County, MO
Dear Sirs,

I was arrested last year on May 17, 2003 for DWI. Now before you get all excited and afraid this is not a DWI case that involved any loss of life or property. I was pulled over for failure to use my blinker. From the beginning they had no case, just a case of zeal that has lead them to Perjury and Suborning Perjury. The state of Missouri has no defined instructions for giving the breathalyzer test. After I failed the first attempt, I blew, per the police report for a steady 15 seconds, the machine responded with an invalid result. I never refused to do anything.

The arresting officer did not know how to administer the One Leg Stand nor the Walk and Turn test, and if you can believe his testimony, he still does not know some 11 months later. You see in the prescribed National Highway and Safety Administration Standard prior to both test the suspect should be given the opportunity to remove his shoes if he has more than a 2” heel, cowboy boots have a 2 ½” heel.

Those are the facts and they are not disputed. My issue arises from the testimony given by the arresting officers and thus the testimony supported by the prosecution. At trial the arresting officer testified that it was a 4” heel not a 2” heel that required the prior notice. At trial the officer who had administered the breathalyzer test testified that I had not blown for a solid 15 seconds as he had represented in his prior statement.

You could almost believe that these two officers were idiots without the mental ability to remember the facts, but you need to be aware of an additional fact. Prior to the trial I made pretrial motions. The three key pretrial motions were:

Motion for discovery of the Standardized procedure for performing the Standardized Field Sobriety test.

Motion to exclude all reference to the Field sobriety test because I was wearing Cowboy boots with 2 ½ heel. And the high heel condition is in conflict with the state procedure for the test.

Motion to exclude the non existent refusal, having blown 15-16 seconds.

All three motions were denied. For whatever reason the prosecution had the arresting officers in court during these pretrial motions, they were therefore coach and made aware of the issues prior to trail. Therefore the prosecution at minimum by providing them the information gave them information prior to their at trial testimony. The prosecution told them what my issues were and what I would be asking them to testify to at trial. And because of that I feel the prosecution suborned perjury in that they coached them, and then they allowed them to lie at trial, on the stand.

Time is of the essence, if there is anything you need from me in this regard, please let me know.
Regards

David G. Jeep

enclosure

Monday, March 29, 2004

Respondent's Motion for Removal of Commissioner Jones in regard to this issue

Pro Se

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS

STATE OF MISSOURI

Sharon Gayle Jeep,

Petitioner,

and

David Gerard Jeep,

Respondent

)

Case No.: 03FC-10670M & 03FC-12243

Presiding Judge of Division 65

Respondent's Motion for Removal of Commissioner Jones in regard to this issue

COMES NOW Respondent, David G. Jeep, and moves this Court to remove Commissioner Jones in the above referenced issues.

Respondent states as follows:

The original action in this issue was an ex parte order of protection
As a result of the Ex Parte the Commissioner heard the issue in St. Louis County Circuit Court as #03FC-10670M, Sharon Jeep v David G. Jeep. The commissioner put in force a full order of protection for a 12 month period on or about 11/19/03.
In the original Ex Parte petition filed by the petitioner there was never actually listed anything that could even be construed as abuse.
At the hearing the petitioner again refused to offer up anything in terms of any assertion of abuse.
Thus there has been no accusation or assertion of abuse.
The commissioner ruled referencing some pattern which he did not and has not shared to date.
The commissioner never provided and actual finding in regard to the abuse.
Since there was no actual finding and since there was no actual allegation, the respondent’s civil right to due process and the inalienable right to life liberty (my home and family) and the pursuit of happiness have been denied without grounds.
The respondent’s civil rights have been continually been ignored.
The respondent has been forced into the street, virtually.
Because of the unfounded order of protection I have been forced from my home, from my family.
One child was born of the marriage, namely: Patrick Brandon Jeep Born December 22, 1994, SSN XXX-XX-XXX
Because of the groundless order the respondent has been kept from his minor child. And forced into a visitation schedule that does not even come close to his legal right of equal time.
For the last four months the respondent has been granted only limited access to his son. The Respondent feels that the commissioner, because he has refused to rehear the issue and because he has never offered an actual finding in the case has failed in or ignored his judicial duties.
Therefore I ask that you remove him from the case and order and immediate reversal and or rehearing of the full order of protection.
In that this groundless order has been used to unlawfully force the Respondent from his family and home, he asks the court for an immediate removal of Commissioner Jones, a reversal of the order and or a reconsideration of the full order of protection.

______________________________________

David G. Jeep, Respondent

Dated this 29^th day of March 2004


	Pro Se

Respondent's Motion for Removal of Commissioner Jones in regard to this issue

Wednesday, March 17, 2004

Sentencing Transcript on appeal Cause No. CR203-1336M, S. D. No. 26269

IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

SOUTHERN DISTRICT

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v. S. D. No. 26269

DAVID G. JEEP,

Appellant.

IN THE CAMDEN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ASSOCIATE DIVISION

The Honorable Bruce Colyer, Judge

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Plaintiff,

v. Cause No. CR203-1336M

DAVID G. JEEP,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL

APPEARANCES:

Mr. W. Steven Rives Mr. W. James Icenogle

Attorney at Law Attorney at Law

2140 Bagnell Dam Blvd. 1 Court Circle, Suite 10

Lake Ozark, MO 65049 Camdenton, MO 65020

For: State For: State

(Appeared 2/3/04) (Appeared 3/17/04)

Mr. David G. Jeep

16325 Centerpointe Drive

Grover, MO 63040-1602

Pro Se

Transcribed by

Jennifer M. van Rosmalen, CERT

Certified Electronic Reporter and Transcriber

Official Transcription Vendor for

Office of State Courts Administrator

I N D E X

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2004

PAGE

Jury Panel Sworn 7

Voir Dire Examination of Jury Panel 9

Jury Sworn 41

MAI-CR 302.01 and 302.02 Ready to Jury 44

Opening Statement by Mr. Rives 44

Opening Statement by Mr. Jeep 47

STATE'S EVIDENCE:

ALEX LITTLE

Direct Examination by Mr. Rives 52

Cross-Examination by Mr. Jeep 78

DAVID MATTHEW SCHWENN

Direct Examination by Mr. Rives 90

Cross-Examination by Mr. Jeep 98

TIM TAYLOR

Direct Examination by Mr. Rives 99

Cross-Examination by Mr. Jeep 118

States rests 122

DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE:

ALEX LITTLE

Direct Examination by Mr. Jeep 122

CHRISTINE LYNN SILVA

Direct Examination by Mr. Jeep 131

Cross-Examination by Mr. Rives 136

DAVID G. JEEP

Direct Testimony by Mr. Jeep 143

Cross-Examination by Mr. Rives 150

Defendant rests 165

I N D E X

(Continued)

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2004

PAGE

STATE'S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE:

DAVID MATTHEW SCHWENN

Direct Examination by Mr. Rives 165

DEFENDANT'S SURREBUTTAL EVIDENCE:

ALEX LITTLE

Direct Examination by Mr. Jeep 169

Instruction Conference 172

MAI-CR 302.01 and 302.02 Re-read to Jury 173

Instructions Read to Jury 173

Opening Argument by Mr. Rives 178

Closing Argument by Mr. Jeep 182

Closing Argument by Mr. Rives 190

Bailiff sworn 191

Verdicts Read 196

SENTENCING:

Instruction Conference 199

Instructions Ready to Jury 201

Opening argument by Mr. Rives 203

Closing Argument by Mr. Jeep 206

Closing Argument by Mr. Rives 208

Bailiff sworn 210

Verdict Read 213

o0o

I N D E X

(Continued)

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2004

PAGE

Motion for Mistrial 219

Motion Denied 225

Motion to Overturn Verdict 219

Motion Withdrawn 226

Motion for Directed Verdict 220

Motion Withdrawn 226

Sentence 229

o0o

E X H I B I T S

RECEIVED

STATE'S EXHIBITS:

1 - Certified driving record 114

2 – Lifeloc portable breath test 63

3 - Alcohol influence report 108

4 - BAC Data Master evidence tape 113

5 – Section 2.7, breath-alcohol instrument training 142

6 – DWI arrest documentation, 12/30/77 --

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS:

A – Uncertified driving record --

B - Internet printout of Section 302.190 --

The complete TRANSCRIPT is available upon Request

THE COURT: Very well.

Mr. Jeep, these are your motions. Do you wish to argue your motions?

MR. JEEP: Yes.

THE COURT: Very well. If you would designate which motion you wish to argue at this time and--

MR. JEEP: Well, I would take up the mistrial, the last one first, on the 29th.

It's my position that during the trial, Officer Little testified that a four-inch heel was what required notification and I think--how did I word it here--he repeatedly stated under oath that it was a four-inch heel, not the two-inch heel, that required notification of opportunity for removal of said shoes prior to take both the walk-and-turn and one-leg-stand test.

I submit that the National Highway Safety standard requires individuals wearing more than a two-inch high heel should be given the opportunity to remove their shoes. He said he had been trained in that and he testified as an authority and it was--he was wrong. It was just not--I provided a copy of the DWI detection and standardization field sobriety test participant manual, 2002, which I did not have at the time of the trial; only became available to me later. I had asked for it prior to trial, but the prosecutor would not provide one. Neither would the State I guess.

But on page--let's see here--these pages aren't numbered, but it's section 8, page 11, item 4, "test conditions", the second paragraph, the last sentence says:

"Individuals wearing heels more than two inches high should be given the opportunity to remove their shoes."

This is the standard that I was told that the State would apply to me and the State testified that it was a four-inch heel at trial, and it's clearly a two-inch heel in the documentation here. That's my position on that issue.

On the second issue that I spoke of in my motion, Officer Taylor had given a swore--what I believed to be a sworn testimony as part of the police record where he stated that I blew for 15 seconds. When I asked him that at trial, he said, no, that's not what it was. I hadn't blown a steady blow for 15 seconds. I repeated the question, and again he refused to confirm his prior statement. This conflict in what he had said in a prior statement and what he says at trial I felt was prejudicial and against me and something I couldn't have foreseen or been asked to defend against because he changed his story basically from the report to the testimony.

Those are the two points that I feel warrant a mistrial.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else with regard to that motion?

MR. JEEP: No.

THE COURT: Mr. Icenogle?

MR. ICENOGLE: Briefly in response, Your Honor.

As the Court's aware, the NHTSA standards are not mandatory. As I understand the defendant's argument, it is essentially that Officer Taylor testified that--Officer Taylor testified that he believed that the NHTSA standard was a four-inch heel and not a two-inch heel. I don't recall the testimony in that regard, but it really doesn't matter what it was because it's his recollection as to what the NHTSA standard is is not critical in this case, and if defendant wished to cross-examine him using that NHTSA standard, it was up to him to get the appropriate NHTSA statements.

He has suggested that somehow it is the obligation of the State[1] to provide him with that. Obviously, it is not.

With respect to I guess what he's saying is that Officer Taylor said something in his report that was different than what his testimony is. Obviously, likewise, it's up to Mr. Jeep to point that out to the jury through the utilization of the report in question. In essence, it's too late[2] to make that argument at this time.

THE COURT: Mr. Jeep, I think you--at least the Court's taking the position that if you wish to impeach a witness by the use of standards, assuming that you have the right to do that, it was up to you to present that at the time of trial to impeach Mr.--or Officer Little and with regard to that, and I think it was up to you to take the initiative to impeach his testimony at that time.

Secondly, with regard to Officer Taylor, I think the same thing. If it's your position that he testified contrary to his police report, it's this Court's position that you had the opportunity at that time to impeach him as to what his report said as compared to what he testified, and you did not take that opportunity.

Therefore, your motion for mistrial will be denied on both counts.

Now, as to your next?

MR. JEEP: I relinquish the other ones if you're going to deny that one. They're all based on the same two topics, so--

THE COURT: Okay. You do not wish to--You wish to withdraw those motions?

MR. JEEP: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. The other three I think we had--I think there was a total of four, so the other three you're wishing to withdraw?

MR. JEEP: There was two motions and a letter of information basically.

THE COURT: And you wish to with--have--to withdraw having the Court consider those three?

MR. JEEP: If you're going to deny the first one, yes, I want the other two to be (indiscernible).

THE COURT: All right. And I do.

At this time, the Court's ready for sentencing. [3]

Do--Mr. Jeep, do you have any reason to state to this Court as to why sentencing should not take place at this time?

MR. JEEP: I'm going to appeal this.

THE COURT: I mean that's certainly your right.

MR. JEEP: Okay. That's my--

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean I'm not--

MR. JEEP: Okay.

THE COURT: Yeah. And I certainly--Does the State have any reason why sentencing should not be passed--placed at this--take place at this time?

MR. ICENOGLE: It does not. It does not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: State have any--wish to make any statements to the Court with regard to sentencing?

MR. ICENOGLE: Well, given that the jury's verdict was a fine to be determined by the Court, the State's recommendation is the Court impose the maximum fine in both cases.

THE COURT: Mr. Jeep, do you wish to address the Court with regard to Count I and/or Count III? As to Count I, Count I would be the charge of DWI.

MR. JEEP: Well, nothing more than I stated in my motion that I believe that they told me that the standard was NHTSA, I think the prosecutor attorney told me that directly, and--Oh--told me that directly when I made a motion, pre-trial motion as to what the standard was. He told me it was the NHTSA standard. I asked for a copy of that NHTSA standard. He told me he wouldn't give me one. I felt I was being prosecuted under a standard I could not acquire. I did ultimately acquire it after the fact, and I can document that I required it--got it after the fact. I had applied for it prior to, but did not receive it until after the trial date through issues that nobody can really say that were--was anybody's fault, but nonetheless, I feel I was prosecuted to a standard that they didn't adhere to, that they didn't testify to. They testified to it inaccurately.

And that's my only position on that.

THE COURT: Well, what did you do to acquire that standard?

MR. JEEP: I ordered it from a--I first went to the website for NHTSA, and they referred me to a government publications that cost $150 to get this booklet, and I thought that was exorbitant, and I didn't do it. I later found it on disk from the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and I acquired that copy for $50. I ordered it on the 25th of January, they cashed my check on the 30th of January, they shipped it to me on the 9th of February. My trial date was the 3rd of February.

THE COURT: Any reason you could not acquire that earlier?

MR. JEEP: Other than I didn't have any access to it, didn't know about it, had no knowledge of it.

THE COURT: Any reason you couldn't have found--found out and gone to the internet earlier and found it?

MR. JEEP: I was trying, sir. I did my due diligence. I tried.

The State purported that he was a trained technician in this area, and he clearly made a mistake.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. JEEP: That's it, sir.

THE COURT: As to Count I, the Court orders you to pay a fine of $500, plus the cost of this action. As to Count III, which--Count I being the DWI.

Count III being the charge of failure to obey--failure to signal before changing lanes, the Court orders you to pay a fine of $300. In addition, the Court orders you to pay the cost of this action.

With regard to the bond that has been paid that has been--been posted in this matter, the Court orders that bond to apply to your fine and court costs.

Do you wish additional time in which to pay the balance?

MR. JEEP: I can pay the $800. I don't know what the balance would be beyond that, sir.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. JEEP: I don't know what the balance would be beyond that.

THE COURT: Well, there would be approximately $1,100 in court costs I believe.

MR. JEEP: Plus the $800? So I'm--

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: --only going to owe like $150?

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. JEEP: Today I'll only owe like $150, if my math is right? 1,750 was my bond?

THE COURT: Don't hold me to that, but I think--

MR. JEEP: That'd be 650 left--

THE COURT: --there'd be more than that because there's additional court costs in addition to just what the jury fee would be. I would say you're probably looking at close to $2,100, but now don't hold me to that exactly either.

MR. JEEP: I don't have that money right now, sir, no.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JEEP: I need at least 30 days.

THE COURT: I believe May 10th is the payment date normally. The Court will grant you till May 10, 2004, at 9:00 a.m., to pay the balance. If that has not been paid, then you're ordered to be here in court on that date at 9:00.

MR. JEEP: Okay.

MR. ICENOGLE: (Indiscernible) find out (indiscernible).

MR. JEEP: Can I get a total from the clerk I guess then?

THE COURT: The clerk can give you that total.

Okay. Anything further on behalf of the State?

MR. ICENOGLE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything further on behalf of the defendant, Mr. Jeep?

MR. JEEP: No.

THE COURT: Very well.

That will conclude our record in this hearing.

Thank you.

o0o

[1] Judges and Prosecutors can allow violation the Constitution i.e., Brady, BECAUSE THEY HAVE IMMUNITY!!!! Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), says: “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Page 373 U. S. 87. The issue of violating an established standard goes to credibility of the witness and is “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

[2] There is NO STATUTE of limitation on CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES. Judges and Prosecutors can allow violation the Constitution i.e., Brady, BECAUSE THEY HAVE IMMUNITY!!!! Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), says: “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Page 373 U. S. 87. The issue of violating an established standard goes to credibility of the witness and is “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

[3] Judges and Prosecutors can allow violation the Constitution i.e., Brady, BECAUSE THEY HAVE IMMUNITY!!!! Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), says: “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Page 373 U. S. 87. The issue of violating an established standard goes to credibility of the witness and is “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”

Wednesday, February 18, 2004

Appeal No. ED84021, St. Louis County Circuit Court Cir. Ct. #03FC-10670M, Sharon Jeep, RES v David G. Jeep, APP

Wednesday, February 18, 2004

Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
Wainwright Office Building
111 North Seventh Street
Saint Louis, MO 63101

Re: Appeal No. ED84021, St. Louis County Circuit Court
Cir. Ct. #03FC-10670M, Sharon Jeep, RES v David G. Jeep, APP

Dear People,

Please find enclosed all documents specifically requested in your February 04, 2004 letter. I am also herewith enclosing a certified copy of the legal file and an affidavit from Central Transcribing, dated 2/17/04, stating that the transcript will be delayed.

Please let us try to schedule a date for the hearing at your earliest possible convenience. If there is anything further you need from me in this regard, please let me know.

Also let be known that I am herewith transmitting a copy of these documents to the Respondent’s attorney James J. Robinson via prepaid US mail.

If there is anything further I can do for you in this regard, please let me know.

Thank you in advance.

David G. Jeep

David G. Jeep

enclosure

cc: James J. Robinson, Attorney for Respondent (FAX & US Mail)
file

Thursday, February 12, 2004

Motion to DISMISS Bruce Colyer 08-1823

Thursday, February 12, 2004

Bruce Colyer

Associate Circuit Judge

1 Court Circle, Suite 9

Camdenton, Missouri 65020

Fax # 573-346-0369

Re: Case # CR203-1336M

DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing

Dear Mr. Colyer,

I could not come up with this publication prior to the trial. If you remember I made a motion for discovery to acquire the police standard. The Prosecuting attorney asserted that the standard was NHTSA. I made another motion to dismiss based on the fact that I had cowboy boots on that had a 2 ½ ” heel. As I remember it Officers Little and Taylor were in the back of the room while we went through these motions. You think Officer Little and Taylor would have been listening. But, at that time if you remember, I was told I could not get the STANDARDS from the prosecutor/police. It is a matter of public information, and I should have free access to it. Point in fact if they had been true public servants they should have given it to me as a courtesy. Were they plotting their lie already, trying to hide the truth? Or do standards like telling the truth under oath just mean nothing to them.

I may have been naive to believe that the police asserting themselves to be authorities and trained for the NHTSA standard would at least have knowledge of them. I may have also been naïve to assume the police would assert the truth on the stand under oath, and not MISINFORMATION, if not outright lies.

In light of Officer Little’s testimony under oath regarding a 4” heel, please give the enclosed your consideration.

If there is anything you need from me in this regard, please let me know.

Regards

David G. Jeep

enclosure

cc: Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline of Judges,

Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Camden County

Jo McElwee, Clerk of the Court

file