Tuesday, October 13, 2015

Motion for RECONSIDERATION Case No. 4:15CV1533HEA

UNITED STATES EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
FEDERAL COURT - St. Louis DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________
David G. Jeep and heir,      Petitioner/ Plaintiff,
            vs.
Government (corporation) of the United States of America, et al
Defendants / Respondents




  Case No.   4:15CV1533HEA   _

______________________________________________________________________
Motion for RECONSIDERATION
            Clearly the court does not want to assert that it actually read my pro se petition, the asserted “longwinded, rambling, diatribe,” because there were and are independent  controlling elements not addressed by this district court’s over-reaching OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated the 7th day of October, 2015.  These clearly REQUIRE the jurisdiction of this Article III district court as “We the People’s constitutional, incorporated security for the deprivation of any of “We the People’s” reckonable[1] and “cognizable legal rights,” privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.  Thus logically defeating the “subtle and ingenious verbal criticism[2] of stare decisis, in the over-reaching OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated the 7th day of October, 2015.
a)    “All proceedings under sections 455.010 to 455.085 (this includes Protective Orders Section 455.035) are independent of any proceedings for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance and other actions between the parties and are in addition to any other available civil or criminal remedies, unless otherwise specifically provided herein.” (L. 1980 S.B. 524 § 13)
i)     The Statue itself disavows the “domestic relation exception” and invites other remedies. 
The very statute Protective Orders Section 455.035 declares the “domestic relations exception” independent of my petition.  Protective Orders, per the same State of Missouri statute, areindependent of any proceedings for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance and other actions between the parties.” The statute then invites “any other available civil or criminal remedies.
NOTE, the court order is over-reaching in its assertion of claimed damages.[4]  My, clearly unread pro se, petition made no reference or correlation to personal contact with Sharon Jeep.  Sharon Jeep and the co-defendants/respondents took my son and all my worldly possessions via the UNREASONABLE “probable cause” combination of two unrelated infamous allegations via her and the co-defendants/respondents fraudulent and corrupt petition and NOTfacially valid court order[5] issued “in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction"”[6] that was “sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right,[7] that clearly made it coram non judice, respectively.[8]  More specifically while petitioner holds Sharon Jeep culpable for her share of all damages resultant from her fraudulent criminal and instigating actions, she by no means acted alone.  In fact her actions alone, unsupported by the non-exigent and NOTfacially valid court order [9]would have been without significant consequence to this “thick skulled”[10] petitioner.
           And in direct response to the OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, I hold, have always held and will always hold that the 1st Amendment’s “petition for redress of grievances”[11] and the 14th amendment’s UNQUALIFIED Federal Article III Constitutional security for the deprivation of “cognizable legal rights,” with the clearly “reckonable”[12] text, No STATE shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any STATE deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,makes the Article III Federal Courts’ assertion of a “domestic relations exception” to the state’s enforcement of state “domestic relation” law clearly without standing, regardless of the asserted “magic words” of “subtle and ingenious verbal criticism,”[13] in stare decisis.  I fully admit that because of the previous BLINDFOLD OF UNREASONABLE SINCERELY IGNORANT AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY STUPID stare decisis the court may not be able to see that.    
           In direct response to the court’s OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER my original and current position is bolstered, not ignored, by Obergefell’s[14] premiseTo empower the Article III intervention in Obergefell’s marital law, the Supreme Court had to conclude the existence of and then assert jurisdiction of marriage as a constitutional protected right (and thus the equally essential dissolution of marriage[15] i.e., domestic relations law).  Simply, “the right to marry is… under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,” PERIOD.  Once the Supreme Court had concluded and then asserted jurisdiction, under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court then further concluded “couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”  But that ultimate conclusion, concerning couples of the same-sex, cannot and will not limit the premise; the unqualified right to marry is… under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
            Obergefell annihilates the domestic relations exceptionwith its concluded premise, as I cited it in my petition,[16]These considerations lead to the conclusion (i.e., premise used later) that the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,” therefore the so called “domestic relations exception” no longer exists in the court’s beloved but flawed magic words of stare decisis.
           From there, my petition is a simple “petition for redress of grievances” i.e., a 7th amendment claim for civil damages, the CORE issue is the FRAUDULENT, unwarranted unreasonable & unconstitutional combination of two UNRELATED infamous issues into a not “facially valid court order[17] i.e.,:

1.    Exparte Order of Protection (03FC-10670M / 03FC-12243)
2.    (at the time alleged) Misdemeanor Traffic Issue (CR203-1336M), 

issued or adjudicated, respectively, coram non judice because of “a complete absence of all jurisdictions.”[18] 

Signed this Tuesday, October 13, 2015
Signature of Plaintiff(s)
  
______________________________________________
David G. Jeep
GENERAL DELIVERY
Saint Louis, MO  63155-9999
E-Mail Dave@DGJeep.com (preferred)
(314) 514-5228




[1] "reckonability" is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name."  Antonin Scalia: The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,  56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81 (1989)
[2] MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 26 (1883)
[3] My original petition dated Monday, October 05, 2015, page 36, line 20, item 48
[4] See original petition dated Monday, October 05, 2015 references to damages, page 9 line 9, page 39 V. Relief:, money damages page 40 spreadsheet attached and Current Status page 41 line 9.
[5] The assertion of a misdemeanor an alleged traffic violation does not provide probable cause for a ex parte order of protection.  Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03 as provided hear, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction for the stated charge.  “Consequently, it (the judge’s order) can be facially invalid only if it was issued in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).” Id.” PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003). 
[6] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003)
[7] Ashcroft V. Al-Kidd 563 U. S. _(9)_ (2011)), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987).
[8] See court order “Plaintiff alleges that his rights were violated by a state family court judge in 2003, when the judge issued an order of protection barring him from contact with his ex-wife.”
[9] The assertion of a misdemeanor an alleged traffic violation does not provide probable cause for a ex parte order of protection.  Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03 as provided hear, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction for the stated charge.  “Consequently, it (the judge’s order) can be facially invalid only if it was issued in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).” Id.” PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003). 
[10] If a man is negligently or criminally  run over or otherwise negligently or criminally injured in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer’s claim for damage that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thick or thin skull or an unusually weak heart.
[11] The 1st Amendment clearly makes the government CORPORATION liable for reasonable grievances under due process of law. 
[12] "reckonability" is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name."  Antonin Scalia: The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,  56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81 (1989)
[13] MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 26 (1883)
[14] Obergefell V. Hodges 2015 (Page 22)
[15] The idea of marriage without divorce would be inconceivable, same sex, may marry but not divorce.  That is absurd.  
[16] My original petition dated Monday, October 05, 2015, page 4 line 13, page 5 line 28 and page 38 line 19 item 51
[17] The assertion of a misdemeanor traffic violation does not provide probable cause for a ex parte restraining order.  Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03 as provided hear, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction for the stated charge.  “Consequently, it (the judge’s order) can be facially invalid only if it was issued in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).” Id.” PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003). 
[18] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
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