UNITED STATES EASTERN
DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
FEDERAL COURT - St. Louis
DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________
vs.
Government
(corporation) of the United States of America, et al
Defendants
/ Respondents
|
Case No.
4:15CV1533HEA _
|
______________________________________________________________________
Motion
for RECONSIDERATION
Clearly the court does not want to
assert that it actually read my pro se petition, the asserted “longwinded, rambling, diatribe,”
because there were and
are independent controlling elements
not addressed by this district court’s over-reaching
OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated the 7th day of October, 2015. These clearly REQUIRE
the jurisdiction of this Article
III district court as “We the People’s constitutional, incorporated
security for the deprivation of any
of “We the People’s” reckonable[1] and “cognizable legal rights,” privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Thus
logically defeating the “subtle and ingenious verbal criticism”[2]
of stare decisis,
in the over-reaching OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated the 7th day of October,
2015.
I cited[3] Missouri
Revised Statutes Chapter 455, Proceedings independent of others - Section
455.070:
a)
“All
proceedings under sections 455.010 to 455.085 (this includes Protective Orders
Section 455.035) are independent of any proceedings for dissolution of
marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance and other actions between the
parties and are in addition to any other available civil or criminal remedies,
unless otherwise specifically provided herein.” (L. 1980 S.B. 524 § 13)
i)
The
Statue itself disavows the “domestic relation exception” and invites other
remedies.
The very
statute “Protective Orders Section 455.035” declares the
“domestic relations exception” independent
of my petition. Protective Orders, per the same State
of Missouri statute, are “independent of any proceedings for dissolution of marriage, legal
separation, separate maintenance and other actions between the parties.”
The statute then invites “any other available civil or criminal
remedies.”
NOTE, the court order is over-reaching in its assertion of
claimed damages.[4] My,
clearly unread pro se, petition made no
reference or correlation to personal contact with Sharon Jeep. Sharon Jeep and the co-defendants/respondents
took my son and all my worldly possessions via the UNREASONABLE “probable
cause” combination of two unrelated infamous allegations via her and the
co-defendants/respondents fraudulent
and corrupt petition and NOT
“facially valid
court order”[5] issued “in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction"”[6] that was “sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable
official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right,”[7] that clearly made it coram non judice, respectively.[8] More specifically while petitioner holds
Sharon Jeep culpable for her share of all damages resultant from her fraudulent criminal and instigating actions,
she by no means acted alone. In fact her
actions alone, unsupported by the non-exigent
and NOT “facially valid court order” [9]would
have been without significant consequence to this “thick skulled”[10] petitioner.
And in direct response to the OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, I hold, have always held and
will always hold that the 1st Amendment’s
“petition for redress of grievances”[11]
and the 14th amendment’s UNQUALIFIED Federal Article III Constitutional security
for the deprivation of “cognizable legal rights,” with the clearly “reckonable”[12] text, “No
STATE shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any STATE
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” makes the Article III Federal
Courts’ assertion of a “domestic relations exception” to the state’s enforcement of state
“domestic relation” law clearly without standing, regardless of the asserted
“magic words” of “subtle
and ingenious verbal criticism,”[13]
in stare decisis. I fully admit that because of the previous BLINDFOLD OF UNREASONABLE SINCERELY IGNORANT AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY STUPID stare decisis the court may not be
able to see that.
In direct
response to the court’s OPINION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER my original and current position
is bolstered, not ignored, by Obergefell’s[14] premise. To empower the Article III intervention
in Obergefell’s marital law, the
Supreme Court had to conclude the existence of and then assert jurisdiction of
marriage as a constitutional protected right (and thus the equally essential
dissolution of marriage[15] i.e., domestic relations law). Simply, “the right to marry is… under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
PERIOD. Once the Supreme Court had concluded and then
asserted jurisdiction, under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court
then further concluded “couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.” But that ultimate conclusion, concerning couples of the same-sex, cannot and will
not limit the premise; the unqualified right to marry is… under the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Obergefell annihilates
the “domestic relations exception” with its concluded premise, as I cited it
in my petition,[16] “These
considerations lead to the conclusion (i.e.,
premise used later) that the right to marry is a fundamental
right inherent in the liberty of the
person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” therefore the so called
“domestic relations exception” no longer exists in the
court’s beloved but flawed “magic words” of stare decisis.
From there,
my petition is a simple “petition for redress of grievances” i.e., a 7th
amendment claim for civil damages, the
CORE issue is the FRAUDULENT, unwarranted unreasonable & unconstitutional combination
of two UNRELATED infamous issues into a not “facially valid court order”[17] i.e.,:
1.
Exparte Order of Protection
(03FC-10670M / 03FC-12243)
2.
(at
the time alleged) Misdemeanor Traffic Issue (CR203-1336M),
issued or adjudicated, respectively, coram
non judice because of “a complete absence of all
jurisdictions.”[18]
Signed this
Tuesday, October 13, 2015
Signature
of Plaintiff(s)
______________________________________________
David G. Jeep
GENERAL DELIVERY
Saint Louis, MO
63155-9999
E-Mail Dave@DGJeep.com (preferred)
(314) 514-5228
[1] "reckonability" is a needful
characteristic of any law worthy of the name." Antonin Scalia: The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81
(1989)
[2] MR.
JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 26 (1883)
[3] My original petition
dated Monday, October 05, 2015, page 36, line 20, item 48
[4] See original petition dated Monday, October 05, 2015 references to damages, page 9
line 9, page 39 V. Relief:, money damages page 40 spreadsheet attached and Current
Status page 41 line 9.
[5] The assertion of a misdemeanor an alleged traffic violation does not provide probable cause
for a ex parte order of protection.
Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03
as provided hear, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction
for the stated charge. “Consequently, it
(the judge’s order) can be facially invalid only if it was issued in the
"clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349,
356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).” Id.” PENN v.
U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003).
[6] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003)
[7] Ashcroft V. Al-Kidd 563 U. S. _(9)_
(2011)), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987).
[8] See court order “Plaintiff alleges that his rights
were violated by a state family court judge in 2003, when the judge issued an
order of protection barring him from contact with his ex-wife.”
[9] The assertion of a misdemeanor an alleged traffic violation does not provide probable cause
for a ex parte order of protection.
Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03
as provided hear, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction
for the stated charge. “Consequently, it
(the judge’s order) can be facially invalid only if it was issued in the
"clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349,
356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).” Id.” PENN v.
U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003).
[10] If a man is negligently or criminally run over or otherwise negligently or criminally injured
in his body, it is no answer to the sufferer’s claim for damage that he would
have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thick or thin skull or
an unusually weak heart.
[11] The 1st
Amendment clearly makes the government CORPORATION liable for reasonable
grievances under due process of law.
[12] "reckonability" is a needful
characteristic of any law worthy of the name." Antonin Scalia: The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81
(1989)
[13] MR.
JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 26 (1883)
[14] Obergefell V. Hodges 2015 (Page 22)
[15] The idea of marriage without divorce would be
inconceivable, same sex, may marry but not divorce. That is absurd.
[16] My original petition
dated Monday, October 05, 2015, page 4 line 13, page 5 line 28 and page 38 line
19 item 51
[17] The assertion of a misdemeanor traffic
violation does not provide probable cause for a ex parte restraining
order. Clearly based on the original
SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03 as provided hear, there
was a complete absence of jurisdiction for the stated
charge. “Consequently, it (the judge’s
order) can be facially invalid only if it was issued in the "clear absence
of all jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct.
1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (citation omitted).” Id.” PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790
(2003).
[18] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
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