Nobility v. Degradation
Judicial Immunity
There is a false affirmation at the core of American Justice today, Judicial Immunity. Our Judiciary asserts English Common Law as the basis for immunity; The case Floyd and Barker (1607) where a Judge was called into the Star Chamber, an alleged Judicial tribunal, to answer for his Judicial Actions. Lord Coke recorded the only existing record of the Star Chamber's actions. The Judge in question was excused, the presumed reasoning was a "Judge or Justice of Peace: and the Law will not admit any proof against this vehement and violent presumption of Law, that a Justice sworn to do Justice will do injustice."[1]
It should be noted that the Star Chamber itself was disbanded shortly there after for its lack of jurisdiction and authority. It had devolved into a corrupt political tool for attacking ones Royal opponents in court. Furthermore Lord Coke in 1607 was an English Lord and he had the power of the Nobility and thus the Royal authority of the King to assert that Nobility.
In the United States of America, with our Constitution as our legem terrae (law of the land), Royal authority or Noble status has no standing. Any attempt to excuse a "Judge or Justice of Peace" based on that the 1607 ruling is false because it attempts to en-Noble a "Judge or Justice of Peace." That all changed with the American Revolution, we eliminated the Royal rights of the King, Nobility and the Royal class structure. If English common law of this nature was binding still, under The Constitution of the United States of America, you could as easily assert a "King could do no wrong." The assertion of nobility, i.e. Judicial Immunity, attempts to put a "Judge or Justice of Peace" above the inherent fallibility of human nature and the Constitution, the obvious legem terrae (law of the land).
The true premise as a result of the American Revolution in 1776 is the acknowledgement that human fallibility is inescapable. There is NO Royal en-Nobled class; "All men are created equal." Judges are men and thus human fallibility is UNAVOIDABLE. To assert otherwise is to erroneously en-Noble them beyond their constitutional limitation but more importantly beyond their essence, human fallibility.
En-Noblement is in direct opposition to the Constitution for the United States of America's specific prohibition, there are two:
The erroneous grant of nobility has been at the core of American injustice since the Civil War. Immunity for Judges in American case law stems from Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 7 Wall. 523 (1868) @ Page 74 U. S. 536 just post Civil War (1861-1865):
"They are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, unless perhaps where the acts in excess of jurisdiction are done maliciously or corruptly."
That was in 1868 in 1871 at the behest of President Ulysses S. Grant because of the actions of the Klu Klux Klan during reconstruction in the south congress past the Civil Rights Act of 1871 now codified into statute laws as Title 42 § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights and Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242, Criminal Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law. The actual text of the civil and criminal statutes have not changed appreciably since 1871:
"Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."[2]
The Supreme Court responded to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 with Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871) awarding themselves absolute immunity from it:
"This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly" (Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871) @ page 349), (Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) @ page 554) and (Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)).
and exempting themselves via ministerial rule from any personal liability for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Now to any sane reasonable person that seems self-defeating as regards the Bill of Rights as legem terrae (law of the land). You can not now ask the Courts to enforce your rights, they have an exemption for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
This conspiracy of corruption goes further. Under the table Judges conspired so that they were exempted form criminal liability also, under color of law if Judges "subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" they were also not subjected to any criminal prosecution. Now Bradley and all subsequent finding take their authority from Lord Coke Floyd and Barker (1607). And here is where the COMPLETE in context Royalist, En-Nobled, unconstitutional finding becomes even more of a criminal denial, I quote:
"Judge or Justice of Peace: and the Law will not admit any proof against this vehement and violent presumption of Law, that a Justice sworn to do Justice will do injustice; but if he hath conspired before out of Court, this is extrajudicial; but due examination of Causes out of Court, and inquiring by Testimonies, Et similia, is not any Conspiracy, for this he ought to do; but subornation of Witnesses, and false and malicious Persecutions, out of Court, to such whom he knowes will be Indictors, to find any guilty, &c. amounts to an unlawful Conspiracy."
The Supreme Court took the result of the issue in Floyd and Barker (1607), the Judge was excused because of the supposed excerpted assertion "Judge or Justice of Peace: and the Law will not admit any proof against this vehement and violent presumption of Law, that a Justice sworn to do Justice will do injustice." The Supreme Court for self-serving reasons in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871) gave no credence to the exception noted in Floyd and Barker (1607)"; but if he hath conspired before out of Court, this is extrajudicial; but due examination of Causes out of Court, and inquiring by Testimonies, Et similia, is not any Conspiracy, for this he ought to do; but subornation of Witnesses, and false and malicious Persecutions, out of Court, to such whom he knowes will be Indictors, to find any guilty, &c. amounts to an unlawful Conspiracy."
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871) and by reference Floyd and Barker (1607) has now given way to the MASSIVE ALL-CONSUMING CONSPIRACY AGAINST RIGHTS loosed in the America today:
"[A]bsolute immunity… for all persons -- governmental or otherwise -- who were integral parts of the judicial process" for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) @ Page 460 U. S. 335
Not all Justices on the Supreme Court agreed with the finding for immunity. In Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 there were two dissenting justices in 1871. I quote from Justice William O. Douglas's dissent in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 565 (1967)
"The argument that the actions of public officials must not be subjected to judicial scrutiny because to do so would have an inhibiting effect on their work is but a more sophisticated manner of saying "The King can do no wrong.Footnote 2/5 Because the judges were the personal delegates of the King, they should be answerable to him alone. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U. S. 536 (1868)
Chief Justice Cockburn long ago disposed of the argument that liability would deter judges:
"I cannot believe that judges . . . would fail to discharge their duty faithfully and fearlessly according to their oaths and consciences . . . from any fear of exposing themselves to actions at law. I am persuaded that the number of such actions would be infinitely small, and would be easily disposed of. (Page 386 U. S. 566)
While, on the other hand, I can easily conceive cases in which judicial opportunity might be so perverted and abused for the purpose of injustice as that, on sound principles, the authors of such wrong ought to be responsible to the parties wronged." Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, 110 (1869) (C.J. Cockburn, dissenting)." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 565 (1967)
Footnote 2/5 Historically, judicial immunity was a corollary to that theory. Since the King could do no wrong, the judges, his delegates for dispensing justice, "ought not to be drawn into question for any supposed corruption [for this tends] to the slander of the justice of the King." Floyd and Barker, 12 Co.Rep. 23, 25, 77 Eng.Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber 1607). Footnote 2/5)
Charles Sumner, a pre-civil war senator. Sumner represented the plaintiffs in Roberts v. Boston (1845), a case which challenged the legality of segregation. Arguing before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Sumner noted that schools for blacks were physically inferior and that segregation bred harmful psychological and sociological effects—arguments that would be made in Brown v. Board of Education over a century later. Sumner lost the case, but the Massachusetts legislature eventually abolished school segregation in 1855. He for saw the continuing issue America would have for the next, now 150 years.
He knew "segregation and slavery as two sides of the same coin."[3] He saw things clearly. He did not just pay lip service, he stood up for his beliefs. He was beaten with a cane to near death on the floor of the Senate by Representative Preston Brooks an opponent (1856). Sumner did not attend the Senate for the next three years while recovering from the attack. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts General Court reelected him in that same year in November 1856, believing that his vacant chair in the Senate chamber served as a powerful symbol of free speech and resistance to slavery.
Sumner was a longtime enemy of United States Chief Justice Roger Taney, and attacked his decision in the Dred Scott v. Sandford case. In 1865, Sumner said:
"I speak what cannot be denied when I declare that the opinion of the Chief Justice in the case of Dred Scott was more thoroughly abominable than anything of the kind in the history of courts. Judicial baseness reached its lowest point on that occasion. You have not forgotten that terrible decision where a most unrighteous judgment was sustained by a falsification of history. Of course, the Constitution of the United States and every principle of Liberty was falsified, but historical truth was falsified also ..."
Sumner, as a senator, was a supporter and sponsor of the Civil Rights Acts specifically the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
He was a co-author of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was introduced in 1870, and finally enacted a year after his death. The Act guaranteed that everyone, regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, was entitled to the same treatment in "public accommodations" (i.e. inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement). It was the last civil rights legislation for 82 years, and was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1883 (Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
In Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 7 Wall. 523 (1868), Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871), Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 565 (1967) Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) and Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) the only reasoning independent of the 1607 assertion of Nobility was:
If "we subject the established courts of the land to the degradation of private prosecution, we subdue their independence and destroy their authority. Instead of being venerable before the public, they become contemptible." Page 74 U. S. 539
I have to agree, if we subject anybody or anything to "the degradation of private prosecution" we degrade them, "we subdue their independence and destroy their authority." Begging the question, a logical fallacy, petitio principii "assuming the initial point", seems applicable. They assert that "private prosecution" is always "degradation." "Private prosecution" when consistently and judiciously directed is not degradation but remedial and educational. "Private prosecution" is "degradation" when maliciously, corruptly, haphazardly or incompetently applied. Since Judges are the ones to apply it, are they incriminating themselves with their assertion, "private prosecution" is always "degradation." We need to learn from our mistakes rather than obfuscate them with the corrupt, malicious and incompetent veneration and en-Nobling of the Judiciary.
Think of where we would be today if we had listen to Charles Sumner in 1870 when he introduce the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and attempted to criminalize both "segregation and slavery as two sides of the same coin."[4] If we had held our judiciary to a reachable enforceable judicial standard for the protection of our Civil Rights via both public (criminal) and private (civil) prosecution of the legem terrae (law of the land) "for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America."[5]
On a separate note, I would contend that we do not have any individual rights in this country, "Everybody, BUT the innocent victim, has "ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY"" for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America e.g., "To Kill a Mocking Bird, The Denial of Due Process"; but that is another story.
DGJeep"The Earth and everything that's in it" (http://dgjeep.blogspot.com/)
Thursday, March 10, 2011, 4:09:01 PM
I have endured over 7 ½ years (2,685 days +/-) of criminal denial, 411 days of illegal incarceration[6] (where I was humiliated with the denial of the most basic of liberties - regularly and repeatedly subjected to strip searches), two psychological examinations, and 3 ½ years of abject poverty, homelessness and life on the street in my struggle, Jeep v. United States of America.
I say AGAIN Do I have to light myself on fire in the street to get your attention, like the Tunisia suicide protester Mohammed Bouazizi to get the acknowledgment of the Powers that be for the enforcement of OUR "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America"[7] !!!!!
I have NOTHING LEFT TO LOSE!!!!!!!!!!!!
[1] Now it should be noted that this supposedly empowering excerpt is out of context, more about that later. Lord Coke Floyd and Barker (1607, Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 13 Wall. 335 335 (1871) and Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
[2] Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242, Criminal Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law makes the deprivation referenced above a crime. Title 18, U.S.C., Section 241, Criminal Conspiracy for the Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law makes the conspiracy for the the deprivation referenced above a crime.
[3] Donald, David Herbert. "Charles Sumner and the Coming Civil War." New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, Donald, 2: 532
[4] Donald, David Herbert. "Charles Sumner and the Coming Civil War." New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, Donald, 2: 532
[5] Title 42 § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights under color of law, Title 18 § 242, Criminal Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law and Title 18 § 241, Criminal Conspiracy for the Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law makes the conspiracy for the the deprivation referenced above a crime.
[7] Title 42 § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights under color of law, Title 18 § 242, Criminal Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law and Title 18 § 241, Criminal Conspiracy for the Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law makes the conspiracy for the the deprivation referenced above a crime.
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Thanks in advance
To Kill a Mocking Bird, The Denial of Due Process
"Agere sequitur esse"
"Time is of the essence"
David G. Jeep
http://dgjeep.blogspot.com/
E-mail is preferred Dave@DGJeep.com, DGJeep@DGJeep.com
(314) 514-5228
David G. Jeep
c/o The Bridge
1610 Olive Street,
Saint Louis, MO 63103-2316
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