Where is the Moral Difference,
given a corrupt judge and a thief with a gun?
"A country in which nobody is ever really responsible is
Monday, October 17, 2011, 1:58:44 PM
You tell me where is the moral difference, given a corrupt Judge and a thief with gun? One use a gun to get what he wants the other corrupts the authority of the state to get what he wants. To the victim is there any difference in the outcome? The victim is illegally deprived of something of value either way. The means and methods may be a little different but the lingering effect of the public humiliation of a Judge's well-regarded, although ill-deserved, actions can do every bit if not more damage emotionally than a thief with the short-lived threat of violence. Do either the corrupt judge or the thief with a gun have any moral authority? NO!!!!!!!!!!! The Judiciary asserts that credibility is associative, that the corrupt Judge must be immune from prosecution because of his association. That has proved to be a false premise as regards the Kings. We the People thought we disposed of it with our Declaration of Independence in 1776 and with the ratification our Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land in 1788.
Yet one, the thief with gun, can be thrown in Jail for life, in some cases executed, and other, a corrupt Judge, cannot even be prosecuted!!!! I use the example of a Judge as a starter, but the official acting under color of law could be a judge, a prosecutor, a police person or any or "all persons that were integral in the Judicial Process."
"I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption, it is the other way, against the holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Historic responsibility has to make up for the want of legal responsibility. All power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or certainty of corruption by full authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it."
Now why can't the person acting under color of law be prosecuted? We the People have written a constitution that incorporates We the People into a government of the people, by the people and for the people to assure We the People the 5th and 14th Amendment's protection of Due Process of Laws and the 1st Amendment's lawfully un-abridge-able right to petition our government for a redress of grievances as the Supreme Law of the Land. We the People have statute law that assures us it is a crime punishable by prison, fines and civil liability for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America."
Why can't the person acting under color of law be prosecuted? Because the Supreme Court and the present and prior Presidents of the United States ministerially created, granted and sustain "absolute immunity" for crimes under color of law and the attached civil liability. "Absolute immunity" is a massive, at the highest levels, ministerial unconstitutional "unlawful Conspiracy" "before out of Court" to obfuscate theirs and others "false and malicious Persecutions"  under color of law.
I quote from the current ministerally created Supreme Court Precedents that are and have been sustained by President Obama and past Presidents as executives in charge of the prosecution of crimes:
"This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly" Bradley v. Fisher, supra, 80 U. S. 335, 80 U. S. 349, note, at 80 U. S. 350, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 57 (1967). "To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty" Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 428 (1976). "There is, of course, the possibility that, despite the truthfinding safeguards of the judicial process, some defendants might indeed be unjustly convicted on the basis of knowingly false testimony by police officers" Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 345 (1983).
The Supreme Court first addressed immunity nearly 100 years after the ratification (1788) of the constitution with Randall v. Brigham, Page 74 U. S. 536 (1868) and Bradley v. Fisher, (13 Wall) 80 U. S. 335 (1871). That immunity was never an issue before addressed, post Civil War, only adds to the suspect timing of these two rulings, 1868 and 1871. They were both in obvious if not deliberate conspiratorial response to the § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (now Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242) and § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act (now Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & 1985) respectively. During the debates on § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act judicial criminal liability was discussed. President Johnson vetoed the bill specifically noting that it would make Judges liable to it. The Congress in April of 1866 over ruled his veto almost immediately, thus confirming the validity of the law and the congressional intent to make Judges liable to it.
Both Randall v. Brigham, Page 74 U. S. 536 (1868) and Bradley v. Fisher, (13 Wall) 80 U. S. 335 (1871) find their basis in the common law and ignore the We the People's legislature's STATUTE LAW intent with § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and § 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act to make the Judiciary liable.
Now in common law times the law was not written down: it was not "reckonable". The law was whatever the King, his chief justice, his officials, or any of his servants said it was. And admittedly in common law times you could not hold the King, his chief justice, his officials, or any of his servants criminally or civilly liable. There were two reasons, the first was that per the divine right of the king, the King nor his chief justice, his officials, or any of his servants could do anything wrong. They were all acting in the name of the King and to wit "The King can do no wrong." And secondly by the very intrinsic nature of an UNWRITTEN law, the giver of the law, whoever that be, as the source of the ill-defined law could not offend themselves.
But this all changed, with the written, published and ratified Constitution for the United States of America. With the Constitution for the United States of America We the People incorporated ourselves into a government of the people, by the people and for the people to SECURE each other's "reckonable" inalienable rights. The Constitution for the United States of America Article. VI. Second paragraph:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby"
At least that is what We the People thought we did. With a written constitution We the People sought to established the essential and fundamental requirement missing from the Common Law "reckonabilty." Predictability, or as Justice Antonin Scalia asserts, "reckonabilty" is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name." Immunity of any kind is repugnant to the rule of law and the "reckonabilty" of the law by definition!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress." "The courts are in many instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity."
I say it NOW, 2011!!! Justice William O. Douglas said it in 1961 and 1967. Mr. Lowe of Kansas and Mr. Rainey of South Carolina respectively said it originally in 1871.
Impeach the Supreme Court FIVE
for condoning the denial of a Constitutionally secured and congressionally un-abridge-able right to justice and
"fraud upon the court."
Impeach the Supreme Court FIVE for verifiable NOT "good Behaviour," denying the establishment of justice and abridging a Constitutionally secured and congressionally un-abridge-able right, with their deprivation of substantive 7th Amendment justice between the government and the people, Connick, District Attorney, et al. v. Thompson No. 09–571 Decided March 29, 2011 and "fraud upon the court" with Ashcroft v. al-Kidd No. 10–98 Decided May 31, 2011!!!
The Right of Petition is the right to substantive justice between the government and the people. We do not have any individually enforceable rights in this country, "Everybody, BUT the innocent victim, has "ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY"" for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America" e.g., To Kill a Mocking Bird, The Denial of Due Process, The Exclusionary Rule, Grounds for Impeachment, Jeep v Obama, Jeep v United States of America 10-1947, Jeep v Jones "The most humble Petition for a Wirt of Certiorari to the Supreme Court 07-11115."
DGJeep "The Earth and everything that's in it" (www.dgjeep.blogspot.com)
Monday, October 17, 2011, 1:58:44 PM, 2011 10-16-11 Where is the Moral Difference REV 99RX.doc
 "And if you think that is a national problem, consider that the United States is by far the World's greatest power; it is not accountable to its own people for its abuses of power, and that abuse of power flows freely into international circles. Given that reality, there is not a nation in the world that should not fear us in the same way that a reasonable person fears a child (or a thief) with a gun." 31 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. ( Summer 2000 ) JOHN E. WOLFGRAM -- underlining and parenthetical text added
 Mr. Thompson in the New York Times in response to the Supreme Court's ruling in Connick, District Attorney, et al. v. Thompson No. 09–571 Decided March 29, 2011
 "Immunity" Randall v. Brigham, Page 74 U. S. 536 (1868), Bradley v. Fisher, (13 Wall) 80 U. S. 335 (1871) @ Page 80 U. S. 349) (origin Judicial "Absolute Immunity), Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 57 (1967) ( Judicial Immunity as it specifically relates to Civil Rights Statute Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242, and Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & 1985), Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (Judicial "Absolute Immunity" for the nonconsensual sterilization of a health minor child ), Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (Judicial "Absolute Immunity" for having sent the US Marshall's out to physically drag an attorney into court.)
 Dalberg-Acton, John Emerich Edward (1949), Essays on Freedom and Power, Boston: Beacon Press, p. 364
 Ministerially created rules are SECONDARY, in a Democratic Constitutional form of government, to the will of the people as specifically expressed in the Constitution and the Statute law. For anyone to ministerially grant immunity from the Constitution and Statute law is to act in direct conflict with tenor of the commissioner under which the MINISTERIAL authority was granted.
 Lord Coke, Floyd and Barker (1607) "Judge or Justice of Peace: and the Law will not admit any proof against this vehement and violent presumption of Law, that a Justice sworn to do Justice will do injustice; but if he hath conspired before out of Court, this is extrajudicial; but due examination of Causes out of Court, and inquiring by Testimonies, Et similia, is not any Conspiracy, for this he ought to do; but subornation of Witnesses, and false and malicious Persecutions, out of Court, to such whom he knowes will be Indictors, to find any guilty, &c. amounts to an unlawful Conspiracy."
 Congress passed the § 2 of the 1866 Civil rights Act (Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & 1985) over the Veto of President Andrew Johnson, March 27, 1866. An excerpt from his remarks attached to his veto "This provision of the bill seems to be unnecessary.. without invading the immunities of… the judiciary, always essential to the preservation of individual rights; and without impairing the efficiency of ministerial officers, always necessary for the maintenance of public peace and order." "It is, therefore, assumed that… the State courts who should render judgments in antagonism with its terms, and that marshals and sheriffs who should as ministerial officers execute processes sanctioned by State laws and issued by State judges in execution of their judgments, could be brought before other tribunals and there subjected to fine and imprisonment, for the performance of the duties which such State laws might impose."
 The skewed reading of Lord Coke's Common Law ruling in Floyd and Barker (1607), while ignoring the the raison d'être for our revolution in 1776, the establishment of inalienable rights, and Sir William Blackstone's (1765-1769) and John Marshal's (1803) superseding Common Law assertion "(I)it is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is invaded." (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), Page 5 U. S. 163)
 "Predictability, or as Llewellynn puts it, "reckonabilty" is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name." Antonin Scalia, "The Rule of Law as the Law of Rule" The University of Chicago Law Review, Vlu. 56, No. 4, Fall 1989.
 William O. Douglas dissent in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 565 (1967) "Historically, judicial immunity was a corollary to that theory. Since the King could do no wrong, the judges, his delegates for dispensing justice, "ought not to be drawn into question for any supposed corruption [for this tends] to the slander of the justice of the King." Floyd & Barker, 12 Co.Rep. 23, 25, 77 Eng.Rep. 1305, 1307 (Star Chamber 1607). Because the judges were the personal delegates of the King, they should be answerable to him alone. Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 74 U. S. 539."
 "The Treaty "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" is presented for both its binding force as "Supreme Law of the Land", and also for its persuasive force in reason, to help understand the nature of our own Petition Clause, that it is a law of reason freely chosen by our founders: If we now choose it freely as a basis for the organization of free nations, why should we presume that it was less compelling when our Founding Fathers brought the Thirteen Colonies together under one Constitution?" 31 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. ( Summer 2000 ) JOHN E. WOLFGRAM
 Emphasis and underlining added for reference clarity
 Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 374 & 394
 Article III Section 1 the Constitution for the United States of America "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour"
 Amendment VII In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
 Mr. Hoar of Massachusetts stated: "Now, it is an effectual denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws when any class of officers charged under the laws with their administration permanently, and as a rule, refuse to extend that protection. If every sheriff in South Carolina refuses to serve a writ for a colored man, and those sheriffs are kept in office year after year by the people of South Carolina, and no verdict against them for their failure of duty can be obtained before a South Carolina jury, the State of South Carolina, through the class of officers who are its representatives to afford the equal protection of the laws to that class of citizens, has denied that protection. If the jurors of South Carolina constantly and as a rule refuse to do justice between man and man where the rights of a particular class of its citizens are concerned, and that State affords by its legislation no remedy, that is as much a denial to that class of citizens of the equal protection of the laws as if the State itself put on its statute book a statute enacting that no verdict should be rendered in the courts of that State in favor of this class of citizens. " Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. p. 334.( Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), Page 365 U. S. 177) Senator Pratt of Indiana spoke of the discrimination against Union sympathizers and Negroes in the actual enforcement of the laws: "Plausibly and sophistically, it is said the laws of North Carolina do not discriminate against them; that the provisions in favor of rights and liberties are general; that the courts are open to all; that juries, grand and petit, are commanded to hear and redress without distinction as to color, race, or political sentiment." Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. p. 505. (Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), Page 365 U. S. 178)
Thanks in advance
To Kill a Mocking Bird, The Denial of Due Process
"agere sequitor esse"
"Time is of the essence"
David G. Jeep
http://dgjeep.blogspot.com/E-mail is preferred Dave@DGJeep.com, DGJeep@DGJeep.com
David G. Jeep
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Saint Louis, MO 63103-2316