What is the DIFFERENCE between a thief, a prosecutor, a police man and a judge?
Friday, April 29, 2016, 3:39:42 PM
What is the DIFFERENCE between:
1. a thief
2. a prosecutor
3. a policeman
4. a judge
THEY CAN AND DO ALL ACT CRIMINALLY (18 U.S.C. § 241 & 242 Criminal Deprivation of Rights). The only criminal that can or would ever be prosecuted or held liable would be the "thief." The REST would walk, no matter, they put someone in jail for life, had them executed or took their children, everything they owned and liberty!!!!!
What is the DIFFERENCE between:
1. the innocent victim of a thief
2. the innocent victim of a prosecutor[1] – acting criminally withholding evidence
3. the innocent victim of a policeman[2] - acting criminally testilying (police perjury)
4. the innocent victim of a judge[3] – acting criminally without "reasonable probable cause"
THEY ARE ALL INNOCENT VICTIMS. The only innocent victim that might be able to get compensation is "the innocent victim of a thief." There are government agencies and relief organizations that compensate the victim of gun crimes. But the GOVERNMENT refuses to acknowledge our ex industria statute law for the deprivation of rights under color of law as a crime[4] that demands compensation.[5]
Malicious or corrupt OR INCOMPETENT judges[10] turn a blind eye to "malicious or dishonest"[11] unconstitutional persecutions via a prosecutors[12] withholding of "evidence favorable to an accused"[13] with "knowingly false testimony by police officers,"[14] "under color of law." IT HAPPENS EVER SINGLE DAY IN AMERICA!!!!
We need strict vicarious liability for the rights we wrote our constitution to SECURE!!!
Strict vicarious liability for rights under color of law was, is and always will be the raison d'être for We the People to have constitutionally INCORPORATED ourselves into a "government of the people, by the people, for the people."
[1] "To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest. It would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning (Page 424 U. S. 428) of the criminal justice system."Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 428 (1976)
[2] Ibid., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 345 (1983)
[3] "This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it "is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences."" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 554 (1967)
[4] 18 U.S.C. § 241 & 242 Criminal Deprivation of Rights
[5] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985 Civil Action for the Deprivation of Rights
[6] "This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it "is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences."" Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 554 (1967)
[7] "To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. But the alternative of qualifying a prosecutor's immunity would disserve the broader public interest. It would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning (Page 424 U. S. 428) of the criminal justice system."Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 428 (1976)
[8] There is, of course, the possibility that, despite the truthfinding safeguards of the judicial process, some defendants might indeed be unjustly convicted on the basis of knowingly false testimony by police officers. (Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 345 (1983)
[9] "In short, the common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons -- governmental or otherwise -- who were integral parts of the judicial process." Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 335 (1983)
[11] Ibid., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 428 (1976)
[12] Ibid., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 428 (1976)
[13] The Bill of Rights does not require "'difficult problems of proof,' and we must adhere to a "stringent standard of fault," lest municipal liability under §1983 collapse into respondeat superior.12 Bryan County, 520 U. S., at 406, 410; see Canton, 489 U. S., at 391–392."(CONNICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ET AL. v. THOMPSON)
Any violation of rights secures for the INDIVIDUAL person "where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy" (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 167 (1803)) and "it is a general and indisputable rule that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is invaded." (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 164 (1803))
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