Audrey G. Fleissig, District Judge
c/o Gregory J. Linhares - Clerk of Court
St. Louis - Eastern Division
111 South 10th Street, Suite 3.300
St. Louis, MO 63102-1123
Re: Case No. 4:17-cv-02690-AGF - Jeep v Government of the US of A et a!,- "EXCEPTIONS to FACTS as FRAUDULENTLY and errantly stated in the R.I.C.O. "MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated 4th day of December, 2017"
Dear People,
This "Jane Crow" lynching has to STOP. #METOO – "In Defense of the 99.9999% of Males, in the Jane Crow era, that ARE NOT Harvey Weinstein!"
The question of fact and the question of law have been answered numerous times since the first IN COURT November 13, 2003[1] reference and the timely subsequent out of court motion dated 2003 DEC- 5 PM 4:43, as referenced by petitioner's then legal counsel, by the petitioner several times subsequently before this court and others and in the present case.
The R.I.C.O. conspiracy has from day one ignored the unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection and due process of law by the NOT "facially valid court order"[2] - that was issued "in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction,""[3] - "beyond debate"[4] - "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." [5] Now did I, at the onset, have the Supreme Court shibboleth of precedent to advance a charge of fraud on the court by an extra-judicial officer of the court? NO. That took me the better part of fourteen years to learn.
But, I naively thought I had a judiciary that could and would see beyond the tip of their potentially aberrant noses - to the ends of justice. "Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice."[6]
"Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit" (Federalist #51).
I thought our system of justice had learned long ago, to "reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome, and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."[7]
Petitioner has been repeating the undisputed facts and specific points of law for FOURTEEN YEARS at every stage of appeal - with seven trips to the Supreme Court of the United States of America through this United States Eastern District of Missouri Federal Court - St. Louis Division and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals were presciently, CLEARLY and respectively proven wrong then 1883[8] and are similarly, by that very historical precedent, unambiguously wrong NOW 1994[9]/2017.
In good faith, I further advance an appeal, here and now, Monday, December 18, 2017, 4:41:44 PM.
If there is anything further, I can do for you in this regard, please let me know.
Thank you in advance.
"Time is of the essence"
David G. Jeep
enclosure
a. "EXCEPTIONS to FACTS as FRAUDULENTLY and errantly stated in the R.I.C.O. "MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated 4th day of December, 2017""
cc: The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Clerk's Office
My Blog - Monday, December 18, 2017, 4:41:44 PM
[1] February 3, 2004 for the Traffic Ticket - Cause No. CR203-1336M
[2] (Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 356-57 (1978) PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003)) - The assertion of a misdemeanor traffic violation does not provide REASONABLE probable cause for an ex parte order of protection. Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction for the stated charge.
[3] Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam) PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003)
[4] Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 741 (2011), Mullenix v. Luna 577 U. S. ____ (2015)
[5] Ashcroft V. Al-Kidd 563 U. S. _(9)_ (2011), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987).
[8] "The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 26 (1883)
[9] Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994)
UNITED STATES EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
FEDERAL COURT - St. Louis DIVISION
JURY DEMAND
Jeep
v.
Government of the United States of America, et al
Case No. 4:17-cv-02690-AGF
____________________________________________________________________
I. EXCEPTIONS to FACTS as FRAUDULENTLY and errantly stated in the R.I.C.O.[1] "MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated 4th day of December, 2017
____________________________________________________
a.) "Background"
____________________________________________________________________
The Court FRAUDULENTLY stated the question of fact "when the judge issued an order of protection barring him from contact with his ex-wife and granting his ex-wife custody of their child. In his request for relief, plaintiff sought to void the order of protection and family court orders."
A.) Plaintiff never stated he had an issue with "barring him from contact with his ex-wife." Contact - there was never an issue. The motivating DE FACTO result, the DE FACTO intrinsic property and custody settlement resultant form the deprivation of rights was and IS the issue. This, Jane Crow discrimination, is presciently similar to the precedent of, Jim Crow's discrimination, where on the surface the issue was said to be strictly segregation but the motivation, was the DE FACTO result, unequal protection of due process of law. And as I have asserted before the legal correction should be precedent, the same equal protection of DUE PROCESS OF CIVIL[2] and CRIMINAL[3] LAW.
B.) Plaintiff sought "to void the order of protection" because of its DE FACTO intrinsic property and custody settlement." While resolving the court's question of law with Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994) per Missouri Statute:
1.) "As regards an EXPARTE Order that is by Missouri statute (MO Rev Stat § 455.070) independent of any "proceedings for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance and other actions between the parties and are IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER AVAILABLE CIVIL (damages) OR CRIMINAL REMEDIES. Via the OTHER AVAILABLE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL REMEDIES I am requesting ORDER(s) OF CORAM NOBIS (line 1, page 3 Motion for Reconsideration and (item VII. 38) (line 17, page 19) from the original petition and as highlighted I. 1) c) (line 1, page 3), in the "Motion for reconsideration")"
C.) As a question of fact plaintiff sought to "void… family court orders" conditionally upon the above referenced predecessor's unconstitutional denial of due process of law action as remanded to state court, after a civil damages settlement of the issue, for further action consistent with and via "the "domestic relations exception." Basically as an analogy, I am asserting that the ultimate decisions, the final divorce decree which the federal courts unconstitutionally deny 14th amendment protection, was unconstitutionally DE FACTO distorted because the petitioner had been proverbially unconstitutionally knee-capped at the start of the race.
Petitioner was stripped naked and thrown on the street, UNCONSTITUTIONALLY, and then forced to compete against an adversary that had been empowered by EVERYTHING that had been taken form the petitioner.
The issue of custody, while still being of GREAT importance, is now only symbolic; my son is 23 years old. The issue of a civil settlement can be resolved via the denial of rights on the federal issue of 42 U.S. Code § 1983&1985 - Civil action for deprivation of rights.
D.) "The Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over family court matters. See Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994) ("The domestic relations exception. . . divests the federal courts of jurisdiction over any action for which the subject is a divorce, allowance of alimony, or child custody.")."
1.) While the 8TH Circuit may have unconstitutionally authorized the disregard for the 14th Amendment's security, "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;" the Petitioner REJECTS that conclusion in the Jane Crow era, as it was rejected in the Jim Crow and Juvenile Crow era's.[4]
2.) Independent of UNCONSTITUTIONAL precedent - the Court failed to address petitioners' argument as prescribed by Missouri statute question of law is independent (MO Rev Stat § 455.070 (2013)) of any "proceedings for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance and other actions between the parties and are IN ADDITION TO ANY OTHER AVAILABLE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL REMEDIES. - VII. 38) (line 17, page 19) from the original petition and as highlighted I. 1) c) (line 1, page 3), in the "Motion for reconsideration."
E.) Now as regards "overturn plaintiff's state court conviction for DWI." The Court failed to reference any of the constitutional arguments stated in the original petition, item VII. 33 (line 1, page 18):
1.) While the charge of DWI, resulted in a conviction, the conviction was a violation of constitutional rights i.e., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83. More specifically a DWI conviction where the state withheld evidence per United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 103 (1976) i.e., "The rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, arguably applies in three quite different situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense."
2.) Petitioner had filed a motion pretrial for the NHTSA | National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standard did not receive it. The State's witness, Alex Little, Officer Badge #920 offered false testimony contradicting the subsequently discovered NHTSA standard. Additionally the State's witness, Tim Taylor Officer Badge #913 offered surprise testimony at trial that contradicted petitioner's and officer's own, prior, sworn police arrest statement at trial subsequently discovered. These can both be made clear with the transcript and additional documentation, now in the possession of the petitioner.
F.) Additionally the court fails to address the petitioner's principal argument the unreasonable / unconstitutional combination of the two unrelated issues i.e., an alleged misdemeanor traffic violation as unreasonable, unrelated and unconstitutional probable cause for an ex parte order of protection i.e., item VI. Facts of the Case (line 17 page 7) of the original petition. This is beyond any non-exigent reasonable legal argument.
_____________________________________
b.) "Discussion"
_____________________________________
As stated above the 14th amendment's assertion of "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." is not deniable or mutable without a declared and specific exigency by this court, the Circuit Court, Supreme Court or any other court.
I restate the still prescient assertion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 26&62(1883), I quote just part of the introduction and conclusion here:
"The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism…."
"If the constitutional amendments be enforced according to the intent with which, as I conceive, they were adopted, there cannot be, in this republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to another class with power in the latter to dole out to the former just such privileges as they may choose to grant. The supreme law of the land has decreed that no authority shall be exercised in this country upon the basis of discrimination, in respect of civil rights, against freemen and citizens…)
But even beyond that undisputable constitutional prohibition, Missouri's own statute MO Rev Stat § 455.070 specifically states an ex parte order is independent of any ""proceedings for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance and other actions between the parties" and invites "any other available civil or criminal remedies" thus negating Kahn's claim of precedential authority.
"The most critical and agreed fact of the R.I.C.O. "MEMORANDUM AND ORDER dated 4th day of December, 2017" was "the Court's note that plaintiff's complaint was substantially similar to several previous cases plaintiff had brought before the Court, all of which were dismissed pre-service'" (bottom of page 1 and top of page 2). This creates the R.I.C.O. action against rights over 10 years.
The question of fact and the question of law have been answered numerous times since the first IN COURT November 13, 2003[5] reference and the timely subsequent out of court motion dated 2003 DEC- 5 PM 4:43 reference by petitioner's then legal counsel.
Petitioner has been repeating them at every stage of appeal since - with 7 trips to the Supreme Court of the United States of America through this United States Eastern District of Missouri Federal Court - St. Louis Division and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals were presciently and CLEARLY proven wrong, respectively, then 1883[6] and are similarly, by that historical precedent, wrong NOW 1994[7].
This and all prior submissions answered the question of fact with undisputed documentation, a copy of the origin petition as the sworn affidavit in support of UNREASONABLE PROBABLE CAUSE for the NOT "facially valid court order."[8]
The question of law as to personal, institutional and CRIMINAL liability are more than answered by the petitioner's citation of current Supreme Court precedent as regards the constitutional right to reasonable probable cause i.e., "an infamously-scandalous, non-exigent, extra-judicial reckonably[9] UNREASONABLE gravamen, - a NOT "facially valid court order"[10] - that was issued "in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction,""[11] - "beyond debate"[12] "sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right" [13] is not undisputed by precedent.
"To this day, I am haunted by the vivid (post-traumatic stress) memory of the confirming shrug from the Police Officer when I questioned it as served on Monday November 3, 2003 8:00pm. I am further haunted by the memory of the same confirming shrug when Commissioner Jones first saw the absurdity of the court order on the bench November 20, 2003 as my attorney then highlighted, as he repeated his prior objections." [14]"
____________________________________________________________________
II. CERTIFICATION AND CLOSING
____________________________________________________________________
Respectfully submitted, Monday, December 18, 2017
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
___________________________________
David G. Jeep
GENERAL DELIVERY
Saint Louis, MO 63155-9999
E-Mail Dave@DGJeep.com (preferred)
(314) 514-5228
The plaintiff is homeless and without the will to go on because of this issue AND SEEKS EMERGENCY RELIEF!!!!
[1] 18 U.S. Code Chapter 96 - Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations
[5] February 3, 2004 for the Traffic Ticket - Cause No. CR203-1336M
[6] "The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism." JUSTICE HARLAN dissenting in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 26 (1883)
[7] Kahn v. Kahn, 21 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 1994)
[8] (Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 356-57 (1978) PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003)) - The assertion of a misdemeanor traffic violation does not provide REASONABLE probable cause for an ex parte order of protection. Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction for the stated charge.
[9] If reason (reckonabilty) does not limit jurisdiction with probable cause, nothing can."reckonability" is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name." Antonin Scalia: The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81 (1989)
[10] (Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 356-57 (1978) PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003)) - The assertion of a misdemeanor traffic violation does not provide REASONABLE probable cause for an ex parte order of protection. Clearly based on the original SERVED handwritten petition dated 11-03-03, there was a complete absence of jurisdiction for the stated charge.
[11] Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam) PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 790 (2003)
[12] Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. 731, 741 (2011), Mullenix v. Luna 577 U. S. ____ (2015)
[13] Ashcroft V. Al-Kidd 563 U. S. _(9)_ (2011), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 640 (1987).
[14] "To this day, I am haunted by the vivid memory of the confirming shrug from the Police Officer when I questioned it as served on November 3, 2003. I am further haunted by the memory of the same confirming shrug when Commissioner Jones first saw the absurdity of the court order on the bench November 20, 2003 as my attorney then highlighted as he repeated his prior objections." Lisa Nesbit c/o OFFICE OF THE CLERK Thursday, June 15, 2017, 10:23:36 AM
"Agere sequitur esse" ('action follows being')
David G. Jeep,
Federal Inmate #36072-044 (formerly)
www.DGJeep.com
Dave@DGJeep.com
www.DGJeep.com
Dave@DGJeep.com
Mobile (314) 514-5228
David G. Jeep
David G. Jeep
GENERAL DELIVERY
Saint Louis, MO 63155-9999
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