Tuesday, June 14, 2011

Motion for reconsideration dated Tuesday, June 14, 2011

-->

David G. Jeep,          Plaintiff/Petitioner,
            vs.
President Barack Hussein Obama, et al,
Defendants/Respondents
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
))



Case No   4:11-cv-00931-CAS  _







A humble motion for reconsideration of dismissal


1.      First I take humble exception to the NOT random selection of Charles A. Shaw to this case.
2.      As regards “absolute immunity” I site the Constitution for the United States of America Article. VI. Second paragraph – “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”  There is NO IMMUNITY from the Supreme Law of the Land, especially as noted “Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”  I mean “give(n) a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice” (United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 123 (1979),[1] SYKES v. UNITED STATES Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 7, SCALIA, J., dissenting), there is no immunity. 
3.      Strict Scrutiny for constitutional rights without Strict Liability for constitutional rights is, as Thomas Jefferson[2] would say, judicial sophistry.  Strict Scrutiny for constitutional rights without Strict Liability for constitutional rights is not worth the paper it is written on.
4.      The United States of America Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made SECURES We the People rights privileges and immunities.  I mean why would we even write it down if we were not intent upon holding ourselves to it.  
5.      You assert my complaint is frivolous.  Unless you have some inside track, that even I am not aware of, I take exception to your overly broad assumption.  The issues in my complaint have destroyed my life.  Has a person’s children, life, liberty and property some how been ruled to be frivolous.  The issue of the complaint took my SON, My HOME… EVERYTHING.  And I have since the criminal deprivation of my rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America[3] been dealing with effects of emotional decompensation[4] to regain my emotional and financial standing.  And I think the amount of damages, given the undisputed facts attested to by my complaint, is a common law issue for a Jury of my peers.[5]  In my humble opinion it is constantly going up from $150 million.  “Time is of the essence."
6.      Because of your criminal conspiracy of “absolute immunity,” an “extrajudicial[6] unlawful Conspiracy [7] “before out of Court,”[8] I doubt you have actually looked at the evidence.[9]  Therefore I enclose, at the end of this motion, a copy of the original handwritten petition that became the ex-parte order of protection, the infamous order in question at the center of all my issues (07-2614 and 08-1823) in the complaint.  Judge Bennett[10] had no probable cause, thus no jurisdiction to throw me in jail at the pretrial in Camden County.  Judge Goeke clearly had no probable cause, thus no jurisdiction to issue an ex-parte order of protection.[11]  Commissioner Jones had no probable cause, thus no jurisdiction to hold me to answer his made up charges[12] in his kangaroo court.  Judge Colyer[13] had no probable cause, thus no jurisdiction to enter the conviction after my post trial motion revealing the denial of exculpable evidence and the false testimony of Officers Taylor and Little. 
7.      Clearly there is no probable cause listed to “give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice”[14] of an issue under an ex-parte order of protection.  The first paragraph asserts some kind of violent protest at a hearing in Camden County, it is hearsay, she was not even there, by her own admission.  The assertion should not even have been a part of the application, but I was forced to refute it at the hearing, which I did.  It should also be noted that the Judge of record at the hearing referenced in Camden County, Judge Bennett (see appeal 08-1823), had unbeknownst to the accused at the time, recused himself for his bad acts at the hearing referenced by the then petitioner, my now ex-wife. 
8.      The then petitioner, my ex-wife, did not, as was confirmed at the hearing, mark the boxes “caused physical harm to me” or “attempted to cause physical harm to me.”  Now she does assert that “He has a very verbal abusive tone when he speaks.” I am not sure what an “abusive tone” is, but clearly given “fair notice” it does not amount to probable cause for an ex-parte order of spousal abuse. 
9.      The ex-parte order of protection is in my ex-wife’s handwriting, applied for by ex-wife, ordered by judge Goeke, and heard, over my attorney’s and my PRE-trial, AT-trial and POST-TRIAL constitutional objections, by a judicial officer of limited jurisdiction family commissioner Jones.  It is and was a FRAUD upon the court.[15]  Fraus omnia vitiate. Fraud vitiates everything it touches.
10. Secondly as regard this case being frivolous there is always a first time.  Based on the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and 100 years of stare diesis I am sure that Charles Sumner[16] who filed an equal protection suit regarding segregation in the Boston School in 1845, I estimate thousands of other frivolously regarded petitioners in 100 years and Thurgood Marshall[17] in 1954 ALL looked frivolous.  Yet Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) was ultimately consider and the result is now, as it should have always been, the Supreme Law of the Land.  Where ever there is evil, good will ALWAYS make a start somewhere, somehow!  I am the one that has been attempting to be civil throughout this whole thing.  ANY assertion of personal ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, without proof of divinity, is a fraud by any standard of Justice in a government of free and equal persons on THIS PLANET!!!!!  ANY assertion of governmental ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, acknowledging unavoidable human fallibility, is repugnant to a government of the people, by the people and for the people on THIS PLANET!!!!!
11. Segregation was a criminal conspiracy against rights also.  Segregation was empowered by an immune conspiracy of public ministers at the highest levels to enforce UNEQUAL protection of the laws.  The Presidents, the Supreme Courts, and the Federal Courts at large, all knew EXACTLY what was happening with Jim Crow’s lynchings and the UNEQUAL governmental funding for the Education of African Americans.  But they were all wallowing in their criminal[18] unconstitutional assertion of “absolute immunity” for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”[19]  And for 100 years THEY DID ABSOLUTEY NOTHING, again, covered by their criminal[20] assertion of “absolute immunity” and their deliberate indifference to RIGHTS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12. The dissent in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U. S. 357 (1871) did not think opposing absolute immunity was frivolous, MR. JUSTICE DAVIS, with whom concurred Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, dissentingBut I dissent from the rule laid down by the majority of the Court that a judge is exempt from liability in a case like the present, where it is alleged not only that his proceeding was in excess of jurisdiction,[21] but that he acted maliciously and corruptly. If he did so, he is, in my opinion, subject to suit the same as a private person would be under like circumstances.”  I may sound a little overly sensitive, I think the Judges in Camden County and the Judges in St. Louis County were all corruptly and maliciously out to get me.  None of them had any clear and credible probable cause and or proof that would standup to exculpable information.  I was clearly deprived of “fair notice” not to mention my “fair notice” 14th amendment right to Due Process of law given “a person of ordinary intelligence.”[22] 
13. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 558 (1967) did not think opposing immunity was frivolous, “I do not think that all judges, under all circumstances, no matter how outrageous their conduct, are immune from suit under 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court's ruling is not justified by the admitted need for a vigorous and independent judiciary, is not commanded by the common law doctrine of judicial immunity, and does not follow inexorably from our prior decisions.” 
14. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U. S. 365 (1978) Justices STEWART, J., MARSHALL and POWELL, JJ. did not think opposing absolute immunity was frivolous, “But the scope of judicial immunity is limited to liability for "judicial acts," and I think that what Judge Stump did on July 9, 1971, was beyond the pale of anything that could sensibly be called a judicial act.”  I feel that Judge Goeke’s and Commissioner Jones fraud upon the court in ordering and hearing a case lacking probable cause for the order, on its face, steps outside the acts "normally performed by a judge" (435 U. S. 365)
15. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissenting in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 362 (1983) did not think the idea of Judges being liable for their actions was frivolous point in fact he went beyond the issue briefed in the petition, witness immunity, and declared that he thought all common law IMMUNITY had been overridden by 42 U.S.C. § 1883: “To assume that Congress, which had enacted a criminal sanction directed against state judicial officials,[23] intended sub silentio to exempt those same officials from the civil counterpart approaches the incredible.[24]  Sheriffs and marshals, while performing a quintessentially judicial function such as serving process, were clearly liable under the 1866 Act, notwithstanding President Johnson's objections. Because, (Page 460 U. S. 363) as Representative Shellabarger stated, § 1 of the 1871 Act provided a civil remedy "in identically the same case" or "on the same state of facts" as § 2 of the 1866 Act, it obviously overrode whatever immunity may have existed at common law for these participants in the judicial process in 1871.”
16. And our current Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia appears to agree in his recent VEHEMENT dissent as to the vagueness in SYKES v. UNITED STATES (Cite as: 564 U. S. ____ (2011) 7, SCALIA, J., dissenting) “give a person of ordinary(sp) intelligence fair notice” of its reach, United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 123 (1979)[25] (internal quotation marks omitted).”  There is nothing vague about Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242 and Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & 1985As I assert as part of my pleading this is also a PRIVATE PROSECUTION of “penal statutes” Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242. I would assert that the penal statute Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242 and the civil statute Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & 1985 are therefore inextricably linked.  The penal  Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242 gives “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice” that their rights are secured by criminal and civil liability for their deprivation.   
17. As regards Kahn v. Kahn and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), I assert that Kahn v. Kahn and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) are frivolous based on common sense.  Who in there right mind would give up any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America[26] when literally everything from your children to everything you own is on the line. 
18. Now granted I do not have the shibboleth[27], I beg your indulgence.  But for the sake of a thorough argument Kahn v. Kahn and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) relate to the state’s rights enforcement of the Jane Crow[28] laws.  I site by reference all the acts of congress and the precedents of the Supreme Court that nullified the Jim Crow racial discrimination laws that asserted “Race Relations” as a state’s rights issue.  The Jane Crow era is supported by a fallacious assertion of States Rights in Domestic Relations while denying the 14th Amendment’s protection. 
19. What it all comes down to is giving “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice.”[29]  Absolute immunity is repugnant to the Rule of law by definition.  The Rule of Law, the Constitution of the United States of America as written, adopted and supported as the Supreme Law of the Land does not afford ANYONE immunity. 


I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Signed this Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Signature of Plaintiff(s)

Revised and extended Wednesday, June 22, 2011, 2011 06-13-11 Motion for reconisderation  REV 04.doc
_________________________________________
                                   David G. Jeep
David G. Jeep
c/o The Bridge
1610 Olive Street
Saint Louis, MO 63103-2316

E-Mail Dave@DGJeep.com (preferred)
(314) 514-5228





[1] United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 123 “It is a fundamental tenet of due process that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453  (1939). A criminal statute is therefore invalid if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 347 U. S. 617  (1954). See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391-393 (1926); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 405 U. S. 162  (1972); Dunn v. United States, ante at 442 U. S. 112-113. So too, vague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. See United States v. Evans,  333 U. S. 483  (1948); United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18  (1948); cf. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399  (1966).”
[2] Thomas Jefferson To John Tyler Monticello, May 26, 1810: “We have long enough suffered under the base prostitution of law to party passions in one judge, and the imbecility of another. In the hands of one the law is nothing more than an ambiguous text, to be explained by his sophistry into any meaning which may subserve his personal malice.”
[4] psychiatry, failure of defense mechanisms resulting in progressive personality disintegration.
[5] Amendment 7 In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
[6] Lord Coke Floyd and Barker (1607) but if he hath conspired before out of Court, this is extrajudicial; but due examination of Causes out of Court, and inquiring by Testimonies, Et similia, is not any Conspiracy, for this he ought to do; but subornation of Witnesses, and false and malicious Persecutions, out of Court, to such whom he knowes will be Indictors, to find any guilty, &c. amounts to an unlawful Conspiracy.
[10] It should be noted as adding credibility to my assertion, Judge Bennett recused himself from the action based on his bad acts at the pretrial hearing.  08-1823
[11] It should be noted that the petitioner did not mark the boxes “caused physical harm to me” or “Attempted to physically harm me” as was confirmed by her testimony at the kangaroo hearing by Commissioner Jones. 07-2614
[12] I quote Family Commissioner Jones from the trial transcript: "The Court finds--First of all, the Court amends the pleadings to conform with the evidence adduced.  The Court does find the allegations of the amended petition to be true."  Despite two post trial motions I was never given a set of those findings.  07-2614
[13] Re: Honorable Bruce E. Colyer, Associate Circuit Judge 08-1823
Dear To whom it may concern,
1.      No. SD30875, Filed: 5-20-11, Timothy R. Cisar, of Lake Ozark, Missouri
2.      No. SD30625, Filed: 5-23-11, Carl M. Ward of Washington, MO
3.      No. SD26269 Case CR203-1336M Filed pro se by David G. Jeep
Judge Colyer's ruling in both of your cases, SD30625 and SD30875, I would suggest comes out his exculpable personal knowledge that the Breath Alcohol Program (BAP) has inherent flaws.   I made him aware of this issue WITH my case CR203-1336M/SD26269/4:07-CV-0506-SOW/8th District US Court of Appeals 08-1823.  Where he criminally denied my civil rights to exculpable information via PRE-trial, AT-trial and POST-trial objections and motions.  It is all on my website and in the court record!!!!
The Police (Alex Little, Officer Badge #920, Tim Taylor Officer Badge #913) State of Missouri, Camden County, and City of Osage Beach on the stand under oath presented false information that contradicted the verifiable exculpable information I was denied PRETRIAL, at TRIAL and POST TRIAL.   They presented false information because they were institutionally ignorant.  The Institution they represented, the institution under whose authority they were empowered to this DAY does not know what it is doing.
The Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services ("DHSS") supports a Scientific method for Breath Alcohol Program.  The Missouri Department of Transportation, Division of Highway Safety wants to enforce Criminal Penalties for the Breath Alcohol Program / DUI.  There is no concerted effort to achieve the ultimate goal.
The HGN test is inconclusive except in well-lit where the subject has been allowed to acclimate to the conditions.  The HGN test cannot be performed in less than well-lit conditions at roadside.  There is not enough light and there are too many distractions.  The HGN cannot be administered in the sally port because it is too bright and the subject's pupils never acclimate, as I was tested. 
The SFST are used as an eyeball estimate of sobriety.  An eyeball estimate of sobriety is NOT scientific unless consistently and accurately  administered for a Criminal Evidentiary Determination.  Especially so as in my case where the arresting officer swore on the stand under oath that a subject could be wearing up to a 4" heel before the offer to remove footwear was tendered.  This contradicts the NHSTA standard of 2" heel as the requirement for the offer to remove shoes.
The SYSTEM is incapacitated by its too diverse bureaucratic make up.  It needs to be put under ONE authority to regulate and STANDARDIZED all its components to create an evidentiary scientific procedure that can be relied on to establish guilt or innocents.  I convinced Governor Blunt of this.  Apparently my arguments did not touch ground with Attorney General Nixon, he has not as Governor enacted the necessary changes.
I made Governor Blunt, and then Attorney General Nixon VERY MUCH AWARE of this via my protestations (See letter on my website dated Missouri Attorney General's Office,  Saturday, April 03, 2004 & Matt Blunt , Jay Nixon Report of a Crime, Cause No. CR203-1336M - SD26269 Wednesday, May 30, 2007) of a CRIMINAL conspiracy to cover the up the Prosecutions denial of exculpable evidence, the police's false testimony and the Trial Judge's (Honorable Bruce E. Colyer, Associate Circuit Judge) CRIMINAL refusal to honor my CIVIL RIGHTS in PRETRIAL, at TRIAL and POST TRIAL motions.
There is no STANDARDIZATION within the system for the HGN, the SFST or the Breathalyzer test.  Nobody knows how the system is suppose to work, nobody knows for example if you are asked to blow for 20 seconds as I was, you will AWLWAYS get and invalid result!!!!!  The Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services ("DHSS") does not have the evidentiary interests of Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) in its processes, thus "the failure of [MoDOT] to adopt the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its duties" under the BAP
MODOT has no idea how to operate the machines they are convicting people with.  And this ongoing incompetent technical ERROR is convicting people while violating the CIVIL RIGHTS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
For more information I ask you to review my blog - Evidence, "The Evidence Tim Taylor's Incriminating Testimony," "The Evidence Alex Litte's Incriminating Testimony" and "The Evidence Petition for an Ex-parte Order of Protection"  http://dgjeep.blogspot.com/search/label/Evidence
[14] United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 123 “fair notice” swings both ways, e.g. The statute against murder may clearly define murder, but that does not mean that you can use it outside its “fair notice” scope and charge a man for murder for having stolen your car.    You can not ask a man to defend himself against an ex-parte order of protection for a petitioner where the only probable cause is an unrelated, hearsay account of a court proceeding from a month prior and 150 miles away where the said petitioning individual by her account was not even actually present. 
[15] Fraus omnia vitiate. Fraud vitiates everything it touches. When fraud is involved in civil contract or in the establishment of a law, all such laws or contracts are unraveled, made into nothing at all. If fraud can be proven, such laws by their natures could not exist, for they were created under both a false pretense, as well as created with understanding and assent on false pretenses.
[16] “In 1845, Sumner represented the plaintiffs in Roberts v. Boston, a case which challenged the legality of segregation. Arguing before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Sumner noted that schools for blacks were physically inferior and that segregation bred harmful psychological and sociological effects—arguments that would be made in Brown v. Board of Education over a century later.  Sumner lost the case, but the Massachusetts legislature eventually abolished school segregation in 1855.”
[17] Thurgood Marshall (July 2, 1908 – January 24, 1993) was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, serving from October 1967 until October 1991. Marshall was the Court's 96th justice and its first African American justice.
[21] With the flagrant disregard for credible probable cause none of the Judicial Officers in the action had Jurisdiction. 
[22] United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 123 “fair notice” swings both ways, e.g. The statute against murder may clearly define murder, but that does not mean that you can use it outside its “fair notice” scope and charge a man for murder for having stolen your car.    You can not ask a man to defend himself against an ex-parte order of protection for a petitioner where the only probable cause is an unrelated, hearsay account of a court proceeding from a month prior and 150 miles away where the said petitioning individual by her account was not even actually present.
[23] [Footnote 2/26] The majority does concede that witnesses can be punished criminally for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the modern successor of § 2 of the 1866 Act. See ante at 460 U. S. 345, n. 32. It cannot go without mention that the classic English formulation of absolute witness immunity by Lord Mansfield, which even the majority quotes, ante at 460 U. S. 335, precluded civil or criminal liability. King v. Skinner, Lofft 54, 56, 98 Eng.Rep. 529 (K.B. 1772) ("[N]either party, witness, counsel, jury, or judge can be put to answer, civilly or criminally,  for words spoken in office") (emphasis added). Under early common law, perjury was not a punishable offense. Jurors were merely a body of witnesses whose verdict was based on their own personal knowledge, and not on the evidence of others testifying before them. The only method of punishment was by a writ of attaint. See generally 4 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 515-519 (3d ed.1924); Damport v. Sympson, Cro.Eliz. 520, 78 Eng.Rep. 769 (Q.B. 1596).
[24] [Footnote 2/27] See Kates, Immunity of State Judges under the Federal Civil Rights Acts, 65 Nw.U.L.Rev. 615, 622-623 (1970).
[25] United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 123 “It is a fundamental tenet of due process that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453  (1939). A criminal statute is therefore invalid if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 347 U. S. 617  (1954). See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391-393 (1926); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 405 U. S. 162  (1972); Dunn v. United States, ante at 442 U. S. 112-113. So too, vague sentencing provisions may pose constitutional questions if they do not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. See United States v. Evans,  333 U. S. 483  (1948); United States v. Brown, 333 U. S. 18  (1948); cf. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U. S. 399  (1966).”
[27] All the citations and reference precedent
[28]  The "Jane Crow" Era, the courts preference for mother’s/a woman’s rights over a father’s/man’s rights in Domestic Relation Law
The "Jane Crow" Era, “It doesn't take a cynic to point out that when a woman is getting a divorce, what she may truly fear is not violence, but losing the house or kids. Under an exparte order of protection, if she's willing to fib to the judge and say she is "in fear" of her children's father, she will get custody and money and probably the house.”
fait accompli, "A man against whom a frivolous exparte order of protection has been brought starts to lose any power in his divorce proceeding. They do start decompensating, and they do start to have emotional issues, and they do start developing post-traumatic stress disorders. They keep replaying in their minds the tape of what happened to them in court. It starts this whole vicious downward cycle. They've been embarrassed and shamed in front of their family and friends, unjustly, and they totally lose any sense of self-control and self-respect. They may indeed become verbally abusive. It's difficult for the court to see where that person was prior to the restraining order."  “The Booming Domestic Violence Industry” - Massachusetts News, 08/02/99, By John Maguire, Hitting below the belt Monday, 10/25/99 12:00 ET, By Cathy Young, Salon - Divorced men claim discrimination by state courts, 09/07/99, By Erica Noonan, Associated Press, Dads to Sue for Discrimination, 08/24/99, By Amy Sinatra, ABCNEWS.com, The Federal Scheme to Destroy Father-Child Relationships, by Jake Morphonios, 02/13/08
[29] United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 123 “fair notice” swings both ways, e.g. The statute against murder may clearly define murder, but that does not mean that you can use it outside its “fair notice” scope and charge a man for murder for having stolen your car.    You can not ask a man to defend himself against an ex-parte order of protection for a petitioner where the only probable cause is an unrelated, hearsay account of a court proceeding 150 miles away where the said petitioning individual by her account was not even actually present.